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Abstract 
The global financial turmoil of 2008 has resulted in the curtailment of military expenditure in 
most western countries. At a sub-regional level reductions in the level of activity at a major 
military facility can have significant economic impact. In the light of this, the paper has two 
objectives: to analyse the impact of the decision to terminate naval shipbuilding at the United 
Kingdom’s Portsmouth Naval Base; and, for illustrative purposes, to examine the possible  
economic consequences of further contraction at the facility. In pursuit of these aims it is 
necessary to establish the output, income and employment generated by the base using a 
bespoke input-output model. The methodology employed can, with appropriate adjustments, 
be utilised in other military or civilian contexts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial turmoil of 2008 has resulted in the curtailment of military expenditure in 
most western countries. In a local context, reductions in activity at a major military installation 
can have significant negative economic ramifications. In the light of this, the article attempts 
to identify the sub-regional impact of a range of possible changes affecting the United 
Kingdom’s Portsmouth Naval Base. More specifically, the study has two objectives; First, to 
consider the impact on the local economy of the decision to end shipbuilding at the Base. 
Second, for illustrative purposes, to assess the economic impact of two additional 
contraction scenarios: the downgrading of the facility to a purely operational status; and base 
closure. In order to achieve these objectives, for comparative purposes, a baseline of the 
2011 impact of the base was established.   
 
The Portsmouth Naval Base is located on the south coast of England and has constituted a 
maritime hub for eight centuries. The facility has attracted a cluster of defence- related 
activities and has stimulated the development of naval heritage tourism. In aggregate, this 
combination of activity is of major benefit to the City of Portsmouth and its hinterland.  An 
assessment of the then economic contribution of the Base was published, immediately prior 
to the world financial crisis (see Asteris et al., 2007). The paper did not however, encompass 
“what if” scenarios contained in this paper. Furthermore, the earlier model has been 
upgraded. In the period since 2007, the economic circumstances of both the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the world in general have become more clouded. For the UK the changed 
environment has implied curtailed public spending in areas such as defence. In responding 
to these cuts the Royal Navy (RN) has been required to shed personnel and physical 
resources. It is this ongoing rebalancing which provides the rationale for the analysis 
contained in this paper.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background whilst Section 3 sets out 
the ‘tools’ of investigation. Next, the economic impact of the Portsmouth Naval Base is 
examined. Section 5 uses the data assembled as the basis for quantifying the implications of 
3 contraction gradations. The penultimate section then considers the extent to which 
redundant defence facilities swiftly re-materialise as civilian resources spawning economic 
benefits. The conclusion highlights the main findings. 
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2.  BACKGROUND 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, numerous studies have been conducted in order to 
establish the impact of reduced military activity on host local economies. Examples from the 
United States of America range from area-wide to base specific studies (see, Sommers, 
2004; Lahr, 2004; Weaver, 2006; Charles, 2010; and Tadlow, 2012). The UK defence sector 
has also come under the academic microscope (see for instance: Bishop, 2000; Grainger, et 
al. 2005; Hunter, 2009; Reference Economic Consultants, 2010; and Doel, 2011). A common 
feature of these studies is that they demonstrate the relatively high multiplier effects 
generated by defence establishments across all sectors of a sub-regional economy and thus 
imply that the impact of change can have substantial ‘knock-on’ effects1. A review of studies 
of defence contraction, over the period from 1968 to 2010, and their methodologies, by Droff 
and Paloyo (2014) is revealing2. It shows that a sizeable number make use of input-output 
models, to quantify the scale of the economic impact. In most cases the analysis is of a 
single event, such as closure or the threat of it. By contrast, the framework in this paper 
permits a number of contraction or expansion outcomes to be considered simultaneously, on 
the basis of a single model. Droff and Paoyo, 2015 also point out the crucial importance of 
‘good’ data. In the case of the Portsmouth Naval Base the authors were fortunate in having 
access to detailed and robust statistics for employment, salaries, and equipment and service 
purchases provided by a range of military and civilian sources within the Base. Where 
statistics were unavailable the assumptions used in estimating them are set out. 
 
The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review - SDSR Cabinet Office, 2010 required a 
reduction in the defence budget of around 8 per cent and set out a reshaping programme 
based on rationalisation of the armed forces. The RN’s role in the blueprint focuses on a 
reduction in uniformed personnel from 35,000 to 29,000 and a diminution in the number of 
warships.  
 
It is intended that in future the active fleet will consist of two new Queen Elizabeth class 
aircraft carriers, 11 submarines; 19 destroyers and frigates3; and a number of smaller and 
specialist craft4. There are also 13 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) ships in service, crewed by 
civilians5. In April 2012 Portsmouth was the base-port for 29 RN surface vessels and just 
under half the Navy’s uniformed personnel.  
 
It will also be ‘home’ to the two new aircraft carriers being built by BAE Systems. This firm is 
crucial to the Navy’s capability in terms of equipment provision, maintenance and support. 
As such it is a key component of Britain’s maritime capability. Research by Oxford 
Economics, 2011 suggested that almost two-fifths of manufacturing jobs in Portsmouth were 
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dependent on the activities of the company in the local area, with 75 per cent of those staff 
residing in South Hampshire. At that time, BAE employed 4,000 people in the Maritime 
Services and Naval Ships divisions at the Base and other locations within the area.  
 
In 2009 BAE and the MoD signed an agreement which guaranteed the former £230 million 
(m) per year of shipbuilding and support work. This agreement specified that BAE would 
provide support for complex warships and base services at Portsmouth. As part of the 
agreement, BAE is committed to efficiency improvements. As a consequence, it was 
announced in November 2013 (see Pickford, 2013) that naval shipbuilding at Portsmouth 
was to end because of insufficient orders to sustain construction at all its UK yards.   
 
 
3. THE ‘TOOLS’ OF INVESTIGATION 
Figure 1 shows the geographical area covered by the paper. This comprises the main urban 
centres of South Hampshire sub-regional economy, with a combined population of over 1.3m 
people and containing about 50,000 businesses. It is estimated6 that in 2011 the area 
produced output of around £48.5billion (bn) equivalent to a Gross Value Added (GVA) of 
around £23.7bn7 and supported around 485,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
The indirect and induced effects of an economic tremor can be measured using input-output 
analysis. Although as Droft and Paloyo, 2014 point out this is not the only technique 
available to the researcher, it is regularly used in defence impact studies. As with all existing 
models, it has both strengths and weaknesses. The input-output technique is effective in 
defining the sectors most likely to be impacted both directly and indirectly from an economic 
setback8. It is, however, a static model, which by its nature, does not pick up other mitigating 
factors that might be occurring at the same time. These include; reinvestment in other 
sectors, or the freeing up capital and labour to shift into more profitable sectors. That stated, 
a later section of this paper emphasises that labour is not homogeneous and does not 
always make a successful transition to alternative sectors9. Despite the above comments, 
the input-output model is extensively used in applied research, principally because of its 
ability to predict the sectors likely to be impacted by an economic shock. Early warning is 
thereby provided, which permits remedial action to be initiated.  
 
The Centre for Economic Analysis and Policy (CEAP) at the University of Portsmouth has 
systematically developed, and revised, a series of such models over a number of years. An 
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earlier version of the model used here is set out in Asteris et al., 2007. The research used for 
this paper uses the same standard form of model. Even so, it incorporates the impact of 
changes to the UK Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC), which brings the statistics in line 
with those used in the rest of Western Europe. The result is that the baseline employment 
data for the model has had to be reverse engineered in order to synchronise with the format 
of the published UK National Input-Output tables, which are based on the earlier 2003 SIC 
construct.   
The core of the model is designed to estimate the likely direct and indirect impact of changes 
in the sub-regional economy following an economic shock.  Whilst it must be acknowledged 
that such models are generally considered to be at their most accurate when compiled using 
survey-based data (see, for example, Bishop et al, 2000; Harris, 1997; or Harris and Liu, 
1998), this approach is both costly and time consuming.  Other approaches, such as hybrid 
survey and non-survey techniques, including the Location Quotient approach, which is used 
in this paper, are useful alternatives.   
After syncronising the data, the standard model form is one where in region or sub-region r 
the inputs from the ith industry per unit of gross output of the jth sector, , are determined by 
the national coefficient, i.e. 
                                                                                 (1) 
In the Location Quotient approach the determining relationship is assumed to be proportional 
with and is thus interpretable as a constant, 
                                    =                                                      (2) 
In the model the value of  is set equal to  if less than or equal to one; otherwise it is set 
equal to one, thus if 
                                       =                                                        (3) 
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(Where   is the proportion of total employment in region r, , in the ith industry and  is 
the proportion of total national employment, , in the ith industry.)  
Then,                                                                              (4)  
                                         = 1                                                           (5)  
 
Thus, for the <1 cases, the model allocates the source of intermediate output to external 
flows in the sub-regional import account. 
 
Local area output estimates can be derived by combining information from a range of 
sources: the UK Input-Output (I-O) Supply and Use tables, the UK Annual Business Enquiry 
(ABI), the UK Annual Population Survey (APS) and the UK Defence Analytical Services 
Agency (DASA).  
 
In the CEAP model, because the UK Input-Output data lag the employment data series, the 
output series (final plus intermediate demand) from the UK (I-O) Supply and Use Tables has 
been rolled forward from 2004 series (last available tables). This has been done using a 
linear regression forecasting function based on the data for the preceding 6 years. The 
Northern Ireland GVA is also stripped out of the series utilising a uniform scalar to give 
industry by industry total output for Great Britain (GB).  
 
ABI employment data, which is available at the GB (rather than the UK) level and below, has 
been converted to full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs. Unfortunately the ABI excludes the self-
employed and those in the armed services. The former are estimated to total around 3.5m 
and the latter over 159,000 overall in GB.  In order to adjust for this shortfall, self-
employment by industrial sections has been redistributed pro-rata to the 123 sectors making 
up the I-O industry groupings10; armed services personnel have been added to I-O sector 
115 (Public administration and defence).  The results provide a more realistic estimate of the 
total FTE jobs than reliance on ABI data alone. Dividing total output in each I-O industry 
sector by the number of augmented FTE jobs gives the average output per FTE for each of 
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the 123 I-O industry sectors in any given year. This forms the basis for distributing output to 
each area based on the estimated employment levels.  
 
Assuming that the diffusion of technology is fairly uniform across GB, this method partially 
compensates for productivity differentials via the industrial structure, but it does not easily 
account for the quality of human capital or the level of physical capital investment. It may be 
argued that there is a positive relationship between the quality of human capital and level of 
investment and the wage level relative to the national average. Thus, if wages are above the 
national average there must be higher local productivity to support this differential.  The 
average output per FTE is adjusted by the relative local 20 percentile wage differential as 
defined by the UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). The 20 percentile wage is 
chosen because the lower levels of the wage stratum are more sensitive to market 
conditions and their wage bargaining strength is more sensitive to overall productivity than 
those at the upper end of the wage scale (see for example Blanchflower, 2007).  
 
The results of this type of estimation have been used to generate estimated Gross Value 
Added (GVA); tests indicate that the methodology is relatively robust. Those by the authors 
suggest that the figures are within a percentage point of the ONS figures. The model tends 
to slightly underestimate in comparison with UK ONS regional GVA estimates but 
overestimate when compared with figures produced by some of the commercial forecasting 
organisations. 
A schematic of the steps in the calculation of local output is shown in figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Output and FTE employment for each of the sectors sub-regionally can be estimated by 
using data from UK ONS and other sources, as set out in the Figure. In the case of 
employment the sub-regional figure is the sum of the lower three totals of FTEs on the left 
hand side of Figure 2. For output, GB output by 123 sectors is divided by GB FTE 
employment for the same 123 sectors (top two blocks in Figure 2) to derive  a vector of 
average output per FTE (uppermost block, right hand side, in Figure 2). The national output 
per FTE job figure is then ‘weighted’ by a local wage/productivity index (2nd block, right hand 
side, Figure 2) to produce a vector of local output per FTE (3rd block, right hand side, Figure 
2). Multiplying this by the vector containing the number of local FTE jobs in each of the 123 
sectors (bottom left block in the right hand column of Figure 2) gives the vector of outputs for 
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each of the 123 sectors present in the local economy. The employment structure within the 
area can be compared to the national structure to obtain a vector of local ‘Location 
Quotients’.11 This is subsequently used to scale down the national input-output tables, to 
derive local input-output coefficients. This in turn, is subtracted from an identity matrix to 
obtain the local Leontief Inverse Matrix, which provides a simulation of the interactions 
between sectors within the sub-regional economy.   
 
The CEAP model can be adapted for more than one sub-regional area using the same basic 
formulation and re-loading appropriate primary data for the new area. It can also be ‘rolled 
forward’ in subsequent years by refreshing both the national and sub-regional data. With 
respect to the Portsmouth Naval Base, direct spending attributable to it, together with related 
household expenditure can then be utilised in the model to estimate the associated indirect 
and induced expenditure within the sub-regional economy.  These, combined with the direct 
economic effects form the aggregate impact of the Naval Base on the sub-regional economy, 
in terms of both the baseline and any alternative scenario. 
 
The overall economic impact of expenditure emulating from the Naval Base (as quantified later 
in the paper), can be divided into four parts – the direct, indirect, induced effects and a feedback 
loop. Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic representation and explanation of these effects. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
The direct and indirect impact of the Base on the sub-regional economy can be measured 
through the employment that the instillation provides to residents of the sub-region and the 
salaries that they subsequently spend within the local economy, as well as the supplies and 
services purchased locally by the Base and its constituent companies (see Figure 3)12. Although 
it is assumed that these households spend their disposable income entirely within the sub-
regional economy, the extent to which this occurs depends upon the area’s capacity to meet 
their demands.  If an industry sector is absent or under-represented locally, goods produced by 
that sector will have to be imported from outside the area. The direct effect of household 
spending locally is thus net of imports. When estimating the multiplier, the model automatically 
compensates for any sectoral under-representation.  
 
The analysis specifically takes account of the fact that many service personnel live in the area 
only during the week or when their ship is in port. It was therefore assumed that these 
individuals spent a smaller portion of their disposable income in the sub-regional economy; the 
remainder being spent at their home region or in other locations that their ship may visit.  The 
Page 9 
 
analysis also acknowledges that at any point in time the majority of Portsmouth-based ships will 
be on active service. Even so, crews spent some time alongside in the City. This suggests that 
crew with home addresses outside the sub-regional area spend a portion of their income on 
local goods and services whilst they are in Portsmouth. Conversely, those who reside locally 
are likely to remit a portion of their disposable income to their families whilst their ship is away 
from its’ ‘home’ port. This was also factored in to the first round impact of spending.   
 
In addition to the direct effect of household spending, account was also taken of cash injections 
provided by others who either worked at the Base or visiting it for a short period. For instance, 
people who commute daily into the Naval Base from their homes outside the sub-region can be 
expected to spend a relatively small sum of money each working day on a narrow band of 
commodities which they purchase whilst in the area. Similarly, visiting ships’ crew and heritage 
tourists will also spend money on selected commodities whilst staying in the area.  
 
The indirect effect takes place when the Naval Base and firms located within it directly purchase 
a proportion of their supplies and services within the area.  As with household spending, the 
value of these expenditures is dependent upon the capacity of the sub-regional economy to 
meet them.  
 
Demand for products and services used by the Naval Base also leads to a multiplier effect via 
the feedback loop as firms within the supply chain restock and take on employees to meet the 
additional demand originating from the Base.  The size of this multiplier also depends upon the 
capacity of local firms to supply the needs of the businesses, which supply the Base.  Again, the 
structure of the local economy determines the magnitude of this effect. 
 
The Induced effects are mainly associated with the first round of household (consumer) 
spending and that of people who visit the base.  A subsequent induced effect, or feedback loop, 
occurs when this primary spending is further re-circulated as other residents are employed in 
sectors that provide goods and services to local shops and businesses selling direct to local 
households.  Local businesses will also need to restock and staff will be employed to meet this 
demand.  Employees of these firms will, in turn, receive a salary, which they themselves will 
spend as consumers in the local economy.  Thus boosting the multiplier effect, conditional on 
the capacity of local firms to supply meet the additional demand. 
 
Estimating the impact of a reduction of activity at the Naval Base involves research based 
largely on published statements. This approach makes it possible to arrive at realistic 
underpinning assumptions: for example, with respect to whether all employment associated 
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with an activity would be lost if work were to be transferred elsewhere, and the probable 
timescale of such a change. The baseline primary quantitative analysis (direct effect) is thus 
adjusted in line with the underpinning assumptions and the indirect and induced effects re-
calculated within the input-output model. By comparing the outcomes of selected changes 
with the baseline, the estimated impact is calculated.   
 
 
4. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE BASE 
 
This section begins by examining the role of the Base within the local defence cluster and 
then considers the facility’s employment and monetary impact. 
 
A number of elements constitute the Naval Base:  
 Personnel working for the Base Commodore,  
 Ships and crews of the Portsmouth Flotilla,  
 RN and tri-service lodger units13; 
 BAE Systems ( Maritime Services and Naval Ship divisions),  
 Civilian contractors14,  
 Historic dockyard attractions and support services15.    
 
The Naval Base is a major component of the local defence cluster. However, there are other 
military entities spread throughout the sub-region (See Asteris et al., (2007)). These include 
the Fleet Headquarters at Whale Island (adjacent to the Naval Base) and two major training 
establishments, HMS Collingwood and HMS Sultan in Fareham and Gosport respectively.   
 
The defence industrial base is also well represented. It includes significant private sector 
suppliers to the MoD, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Qinetiq. These 
firms, in turn, have commercial relations with other organisations locally. Hence, the inter-
linkages between the military and the defence industrial base are substantial.   
 
According to The Defence Analytical and Statistics Agency (DASA 2012) around 27,500 
MoD staff were based in Hampshire in January 2012. Just over 50 per cent of these were 
located within the Portsmouth sub-regional area, with two-thirds of this total in the City of 
Portsmouth. The majority within the area (around 80 per cent) were military personnel. 
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It is estimated that there were 3,750 full-time equivalent (FTE) permanent service and civilian 
staff on the base (out of a total of 11,900 FTE jobs, see Table 1). The majority, 84 per cent, 
worked for BAE, with nearly 50 per cent of all permanent jobs in BAE’s Maritime Services 
division. A further 8,150 FTE jobs within the naval base were associated with ships’ crew, 
permanent contractors and the heritage area. Some 3,500 permanent FTE jobs were held by 
contractors; of these 975 were sub-contractors to BAE16. The remainder, were either 
contracted directly to the Naval Base Command, or worked for one of the civilian firms with 
premises within the facility. These provided essential services such as building maintenance 
and harbour tug operations. Most contractors spent a significant portion of their working time 
at the base. Indeed, some were semi-permanently located there. In the paper it is assumed 
that this category of contractors spent around half their time within the facility. Table 1 
suggests that over 75 per cent of FTE jobs are held by local residents. 
 
Insert Table 1 here  
 
In addition to the 11,900 FTE jobs detailed, there were over 800 daily visitors to the facility. 
These undertook specific tasks, attended meetings or provided ad hoc services. They are 
not included within the employment totals but it is likely that they generate notional 
expenditure. It is assumed that they spent a small amount of money locally, in a similar 
manner to other staff, who commuted to the Base daily. 
 
Data17 suggests that people from across the sub-regional area were employed at the Base; 
the majority lived in the urban areas of South Hampshire with significant concentrations in 
Portsmouth, Gosport, Fareham and Southampton.  A majority of the Southampton cohort 
were employed in shipbuilding (65 per cent), whilst more than forty per cent from Gosport 
were military personnel. Portsmouth residents provide a significant proportion of the labour 
used in Maritime Services, contracting and the heritage area.  
 
In order to estimate the employment and income effects through the multiplier process, it 
was important to determine as closely as possible the direct expenditure generated by 
employment and supply chain activities within the Base18.      
 
The direct expenditure impact was composed of four main elements. First, household 
expenditure: this relates to the 9,125 service and civilian personnel19 working on the Base 
who lived within the area. Primary data on gross salaries for BAE and heritage staff was 
obtained from the companies. Cost of employment figures were available for BAE sub-
contractors from which household income/expenditure was estimated20.  Estimates were also 
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produced for the potential household income/expenditure of MoD civilians, armed service 
personnel and other contractors21. Overall, it is calculated that the gross impact of salaries 
on the local economy in 2011 was over £221m. 
 
In order to distribute local household expenditure the proportion available as disposable 
income from gross salaries was calculated. After deducting for income tax and national 
insurance, in line with the effects of taxes and benefits on household income (Larkin 2011) 
the potential net household expenditure available was calculated at £181.445m.   
 
Turning to armed service personnel employed directly by the Base Commodore, it was 
estimated that the gross salary of local domicile personnel in this cohort was around £2.5m 
per annum – equating to net salaries of just over £2m. Allowing for the effects of expenditure 
taxes and the structure of the local economy, it was estimated that they would make 
expenditures of around £1.2m into the local economy. 
 
The expenditure impact of personnel on Portsmouth-based ships required a more complex 
calculation. Estimates suggest that, on average, ships spend 38 per cent of their time 
‘alongside’, see Asteris et al (2007) 22. As for the potential spend by crews within the local 
economy, it was presumed that those with a local address spent their net income locally, 
minus an amount equivalent to the average daily spend by visiting crew (£43) multiplied by 
the average number of days spent in other ports whilst away from Portsmouth.  
 
Overall, this suggests that locally based ships’ crew living within the sub-regional area had 
gross salaries of around £24m per annum. After deductions this was reduced to around 
£20m of which it was calculated £12m would be spent locally. In total, it was estimated that 
expenditure by locally domiciled service personnel (on ship or shore), was £13.3m per 
annum. When this is added to the £94.9m of estimated expenditure by civilian staff who 
reside locally the figure rises to £108.2m per annum. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, various categories of what might be termed ‘visitors’ to the 
Base constituted the second element of expenditure. These include; visiting ships’ crews, 
Heritage site visitors and the crew of Portsmouth based ships who are domiciled elsewhere 
in the UK outside the surrounding areas.  
 
Data from the Naval Base shows that a total of 32 foreign and non- Portsmouth based UK 
naval vessels and RFAs visited Portsmouth in 2011. The total number of crew of these ships 
was approximately 9,100. Assuming each ship stayed for an average of 4 days, this 
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suggests the equivalent of more than 36,000 potential day visits. Calculating the value of 
spending by these visiting crews in the local area was initially problematic. This was because 
there were no reliable primary figures available, the only sources, in the press, suggesting an 
amount of additional spending when large US capital ships were in port. However, these 
figures were not robust and there was no indication as to how the figure was derived. In 
order to overcome this problem, visiting sailors were classified as if they were overseas 
tourists, and their expenditure was assumed to be the same as that for tourists from their 
home country as defined by the 2010 Travel Trends Survey (ONS 2011). The 31 per cent of 
expenditure that the average tourist spent on accommodation was subtracted from this figure 
to reflect the fact that most would return to their ship each night. Using these assumptions 
the spending impact could be valued. This methodology gave average daily spend figures for 
services personnel in three broad categories: from North America £68; European Union 
countries (including the UK) £43 and the Rest of the World £50. In addition, account was 
taken of the fact that a proportion of service personnel would be required to remain onboard 
during their stay alongside; hence the number of potential daily visits was deflated by 20 per 
cent. 
 
The total value of expenditure by visiting ships’ crews, at 2011 prices, was thus estimated at 
about £2.3 m per year. To determine which sectors benefited from this expenditure, it was 
presumed that the pattern of spending replicated that suggested by the UK Tourism Survey. 
This revealed that the sectors that benefit are: Catering (32 per cent), Transport (26 per 
cent), Retail (23 per cent), Entertainment Services (14 per cent) and Other Services (5 per 
cent).  
 
The crews of Portsmouth Based ships residing outside the local area (approximately 50 per 
cent) were treated the same as other visiting sailors. It is assumed that they spend the 
equivalent of the average daily expenditure by visiting UK crews (£43), multiplied by the 
number of days their ship spent in Portsmouth23. Thus, it was estimated that in total the 
crews of Portsmouth-based ships who were domiciled outside the local area spent around 
£11.2 m per annum in the local economy.      
 
A further element of visitor expenditure was provided by those visitors (mainly civilians) 
attracted to Portsmouth Historic Dockyard. It was reported that the visitor footfall in the year 
to March 2012 was 380,000. Some 30 per cent of these were local people (they therefore 
provided no additional impact and were discounted), 30 per cent were day visitors from 
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outside the local area living within a 90 minute drive time of the Base. The remaining 40 per 
cent were ‘staying’ tourists who spent one or more nights in the local area.  
 
In order to calculate their impact on the local economy it is estimated that those within the 90 
minute drive zone spent an average of £43 each (equivalent to visiting UK service 
personnel) whilst those staying overnight spent £62 as estimated by the 2010 Travel Trends 
Survey (ONS 2011). On this basis, visitors to the Historic Dockyard accounted for 
expenditure of £14.2m per annum into the local economy24. 
 
Taken overall, the total value of ‘visitor’ expenditure was estimated at £27.712m per annum. 
 
Expenditure on supplies and services by the base constitutes the third expenditure element. 
This relates to the value of purchases made by BAE and the Heritage section from other 
local companies25. Purchase ledger data from BAE showed that in 2011 the company spent 
around £192m within the local economy. Of this, over half was accounted for by shipbuilding. 
It was calculated that in addition to local expenditure a further £190m was purchased from 
elsewhere in the UK and £80m from abroad26.  
 
For the Heritage area, valuations were on the basis of primary information supplied or 
published by a number of the organisations within the Portsmouth Historic Dockyard. As with 
BAE, it was assumed that 60 per cent of the expenditure was with companies outside the 
locality. On this basis the Heritage area spent around £5.5m per annum with other local 
companies. Thus, together, BAE and the Heritage area were estimated to directly spend 
£197.5m in the local economy through their purchases from other local companies located 
within the area. 
 
The fourth and final component of expenditure was attributable to commuters and occasional 
visitors to the base. Permanent service and civilian staff whose home was situated within 
commuting distance (adjacent local authority areas) could be expected to spend a small 
proportion of their income in the Portsmouth area. Based on the ONS Expenditure and Food 
Survey, this is likely to be spent in local shops (47 per cent), garages (22 per cent), public 
houses, cafés and restaurants (11per cent) and entertainment outlets (20 per cent). It was 
presumed that they spent an average of £6 a day in the local area (see for instance, Asteris 
et al., 2007). On the supposition that commuters worked a 5 day week and a 46 week year, 
on average they spent £1,380 per annum in the local economy. The analysis suggests that 
the cumulative effect of this group’s spending amounted to £0.64m per annum. 
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Total Direct and Indirect Expenditure 
The combined potential expenditure impact derived from the location of companies and staff 
within the Base is estimated at £334m per annum. As is evident from Table 2, the largest 
portion was from the purchase of supplies and services (£197.5m). Spending by armed 
service and civilian staff, who reside locally, was the second largest portion (£108.2m) whilst 
visitor spending was third (£27.7m). Finally, the residual, (£0.6m) was from estimated 
commuter expenditure. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Given the above estimates, first round local expenditure generated by the Base constituted 
an annual injection of £334m into the local economy (see column 4, Table 2 above). Some 
40 per cent of this represents expenditure by individuals (household, tourist and commuter 
expenditure) (£136.6m) and 60 per cent (£197.5m) the purchase of services and supplies by 
companies. In combination, these two amounts provide the catalyst for the induced and 
indirect multiplier effects. Table 3 shows that this injection spans almost all the industrial and 
commercial sectors of the local economy. The impact is most noticeable in Manufacturing 
and Business and Financial Services. The former broad sector includes Shipbuilding and the 
latter Facilities Management, two sectors where in 2011 BAE played a dominant role within 
the Portsmouth Economy.  
 
Baseline Impact of the Naval Facility  
It is now feasible to trace how these initial injections percolated through the local economy. 
Together with output associated with direct employment at the base, this provides the 
baseline impact against which potential change can be assessed. 
 
As noted earlier, the local economy produced gross output of around £48.5billion in 2011. 
This was the result of the combination of productive capacity and labour within the locality. In 
the national economy productivity rates differ; capital intensive industrial sectors produce 
high rates of output per employee and Service sectors, such as, Facilities Management low 
rates it is assumed this is also the case locally.  
 
In output terms, the largest sectors in the local economy are Financial and business services 
and Manufacturing. In terms of employment, the local economy generated more than 
566,000 jobs, which equated to around 485,000 FTE positions. The most significant 
employment sectors were: the Public Sector, which includes direct MoD service and civilian 
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employment (28 per cent of jobs); Financial and Business Services (21per cent) and Retail 
and Wholesale (12 per cent). Manufacturing, accounted for about 11 per cent of total 
employment. Calculations by the authors suggest that the estimated output per FTE was 
lower in the Naval Base than in the local area generally, which suggests that many of the 
jobs at the base are lower value-added. This is primarily because value added per FTE in 
Facilities management (the sector in which BAE Maritime Services business is located), has 
one of the lowest productivity rates. The estimated total direct output from the Base was 
almost £959m in 2011. Overall, in sectoral terms, this was equivalent to some 4.9 per cent of 
local Public sector output and 2.7 per cent of manufacturing output. Calculations suggest 
that the Base provided around 2 per cent of all local area output. 
 
The output by sector figure in column 1 of Table 3 relates to the activities of those employed at 
the Base, the figure presented also takes account of exports as well as stock building and fixed 
capital formation as set out in the national input-output tables. In Table 3 the accompanying 
levels of jobs are set out by industrial sector rather than by the organization for which they work 
as in Table 2. This shows that overall output from the Base was £958m in 2011 and FTE 
employment of 11,900. Table 3 also sets out the impact of first round spending into the local 
economy by individuals who were employed by or were directly associated with the Base 
(driving the induced effect) and the purchases made in the local economy by the Base itself and 
other organisations located within it (driving the indirect effect). In total these amounted to 
£334.1 million in 2011.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The other key element of the Naval Base is the knock-on impact of its expenditure on the 
wider economy. It is these indirect and induced effects, which the paper examines next.     
 
As stated previously, the model measures the direct impact of the Base and its’ employees 
(the “first round” effect) and it also measures the additional indirect and induced multiplier 
effects that occur when the first round expenditure creates further demand through the 
second, third and fourth tier supply chain linkages27.  
 
Overall, it was calculated that the first round, induced and indirect effects of expenditure 
attributable to the Base created additional final output in excess of £723m within the local 
area. This figure comprises £334m from the first round, £145.5m from the induced and 
£243.5m from the indirect effect.  
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Insert Table 4 here 
 
This expenditure/output also created additional employment within the local economy. 
Average local productivity figures are used to estimate the additional levels of FTE 
employment. The model builds in the diverse productivity levels that apply for each industrial 
sector. This key feature of input-output models is not usually present in alternative 
approaches which provide aggregated figures for the multiplier.  
 
Table 4 shows that expenditure from the base supported almost 7,900 additional FTE jobs 
across the local economy. The main beneficiaries of these additional jobs were the Financial 
and Business Services sector, the Public Sector and Manufacturing. The key feature of the 
Table is that it demonstrates how the activity at the Base rippled out to all local industrial 
sectors and, as was suggested by the direct employment figures, these would be felt across 
South Hampshire.  
 
Baseline measures of local output and employment    
The combination of the primary output and employment data, together with the downstream 
expenditure and the jobs it supports, provides the baseline against which change can be 
subsequently measured. 
 
Insert table 5 here 
Table 5 highlights the baseline position of the naval facility. It is estimated that, overall, it 
generated output of almost £1.7bn in 2011 and supported both directly and indirectly just 
under 20,000 FTE jobs. These figures equate to 3.5 per cent of local output and 4.1 per cent 
of employment. The Base is particularly important to manufacturing in that it provides or 
indirectly supports nearly 7 per cent of all such employment in the area. It is even more 
significant for specific sectors such Shipbuilding (70 per cent of local FTE jobs); Property and 
Facilities Management (27 per cent); Metal Goods (22 per cent) and Public Administration 
and Defence (14 per cent). The final row of Table 6 suggests that every £1m directly 
generated by the Base stimulated another £0.75m of spending in other sectors in the local 
economy. In the case of employment for every 100 FTE jobs at the facility the downstream 
spending generated another 66 jobs elsewhere in the local area. Even without taking 
account of co-located military establishments and the wider defence industrial base, the 
scale and reach of the facility had a sizeable impact on the local economy28.  
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5. PORTSMOUTH NAVAL BASE CONTRACTION SENARIOS 
The article now turns to quantifying the negative impact that different contraction scenarios 
at the Base might entail, beginning with the economic implications of ending naval ship 
construction at Portsmouth.  It then considers the impact of two further contraction scenarios, 
though there is, of course, no official indication that either of these is or was planned. The 
rationale for putting them forward is simply to illustrate the flexibility of the approach adopted 
in this paper. 
 
Assumptions Underpinning the Contraction Scenarios  
The following general assumptions underpin all three of the contractions examined: 
 The UK Defence Budget will continue to be squeezed in future years. 
 Any rundown at the Base is phased in over a 5 year period.  
 New classes of ships constructed by BAE will be subject to through-life support.29 
 Deep maintenance and disposal of nuclear submarines will remain located at 
Devonport. 
 Amphibious ships will all be co-located with the Royal Marines, who are primarily 
based in the West Country. 
 
Specific assumptions applied to individual scenario are as follows: 
 
Scenario 1: ending of shipbuilding at Portsmouth 
 As announced in 2013, shipbuilding ceases at Portsmouth and its workload is shared 
by the two Clyde yards. The present complement of destroyers and frigates remain at 
Portsmouth and are joined by the two new carriers. The consequences are that 
shipbuilding activity at the Base winds down and that Maritime Services continues at 
around its previous level.  
 
 Ships’ crew numbers increase by 15 per cent30; Naval Base civilian and armed 
service staff under Base Commodore control remains at current levels; shipbuilding 
staff levels reduce by 90 per cent31, BAE Maritime Services staff, other contractors 
and heritage site employees remain at current levels.  
 
 On the expenditure side, ships’ crew household expenditure rises by10 per cent; 
household spending by Naval Base civilian and armed service staff under the control 
of the Base Commodore remains at current levels; household spending by 
shipbuilding staff reduces by 70 per cent; household spending by BAE Maritime 
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Services staff, other contractors and staff of the heritage site continues at existing 
levels. Spending by heritage site visitors, visiting ships’ crew all remain at the same 
level. Commuter spending reduces by17 per cent. Spending on supplies and services 
reduces by 45 per cent. 
 
Scenario 2: Base is reduced to a fleet operating station 
 Shipbuilding and deep maintenance take place on the Clyde and at Devonport 
respectively. The current complement of destroyers and frigates remain at 
Portsmouth and are joined by the two new aircraft carriers. The rationale for this is 
that deep maintenance unit costs are reduced by ensuring that there is a continuous 
workload at Devonport and this helps to offset the cost of submarine maintenance. 
BAE withdraw from ship support activity to concentrate on new build work and 
Babcock32 concentrate on ship maintenance activity at Devonport. 
  
 The consequences of the reduction in activity are that shipbuilding and ship support 
activity at Portsmouth winds down, while ships’ crew numbers increase by 15 per 
cent; naval base staff under the control of the Base Commodore decline by 50 per 
cent; shipbuilding staff by 90 per cent; BAE ship support staff and other contractors 
by 80 per cent33, heritage site employment remains at current levels.  
 
 On the expenditure side, household expenditure by ships’ crew increased by10 
percent; household spending by Naval Base civilian and armed service staff under 
the control of the Base Commodore reduced by 45 and 30 per cent34 respectively; 
household expenditure by shipbuilding staff reduced by 70 per cent; household 
expenditure by BAE ship support staff and other contractors reduced by 60 and 70 
per cent respectively; and household expenditure by heritage site spending 
remained at current levels; Spending by heritage visitors and visiting ships’ crew 
remained at current levels, while Commuter spending decreased by 72 per cent. 
Spending on supplies and services reduced by 90 per cent35. 
 
Scenario 3: Base closes and all activity is relocated elsewhere in the UK  
 The rationale for this reduction is that the MoD has to drastically reduce fixed costs 
and does this by concentrating its surface fleet activity at Devonport. If this were to 
happen, it is probable that all associated training and administrative activity would 
also move to the West Country (this move is not included in the simulation) and the 
naval base would be put on the disposal list. The consequences of the contraction 
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are that: no ships’ crew would be located at Portsmouth; the Base Commodores’ 
organisation together with shipbuilding and ship support operations would be 
mothballed and staff moved elsewhere or made redundant. A skeleton ‘crew’ of 
around 10 per cent would be required to maintain the fabric of the base until disposal, 
all contract employment ceases and heritage site employment reduces by 25 per 
cent.  
 
 On the expenditure side, almost all household expenditure is lost although some 
residual expenditure remained, for instance it was assumed that: some service staff 
maintain their home in or around the Portsmouth area; some staff take early 
retirement but remain domicile in the area; others are unable to move for various 
reasons such as a spouses employment. As a result, these former staff would 
continue to spend money in the local economy but at a reduced rate. Heritage visitor 
numbers and their expenditure were thus reduced by 25 per cent; all visiting ships’ 
crew spending was lost. Commuter and casual visitor spending decreased by 94 
percent. Spending on supplies and services reduced by 93 per cent36. 
 
The impact of each scenario 
The outcome of ending shipbuilding at Portsmouth (Scenario1) shows a clear decrease from 
the baseline position. Overall, the total jobs figure of 15,900 is 3,875 below the baseline 
figure and estimated output almost £372m lower. The outcome if Portsmouth became a fleet 
operating base was significantly more serious for the local area. The total number of FTE 
jobs reduced to 9,000 (10,775 below the baseline position) associated economic output was 
reduced to £760m (£921 below the baseline position). Table 6 suggests that the bulk of the 
losses were in Financial and Business Services and Manufacturing (7,300 combined). 
Around half of the losses were from direct jobs, the rest were the result of the consequential 
reduction of downstream expenditure spread across the wider economy. The outcome of the 
Base closing and all the work being transferred elsewhere (Scenario 3) is the most serious 
contraction. It was estimated that 11,275 FTE equivalent direct jobs would be lost, leaving a 
residual of 625. The impact on direct output was to wipe out over £916m of productive 
capacity (leaving a rump of less than £43m). Since a residual of household expenditure 
remained there was still an estimated £112million being pumped into the local economy 
each year and this supported a total of 1,225 downstream FTE jobs. In this scenario, almost 
18,000 FTE jobs were lost with reductions impacting across most sectors of the local 
economy. The effect was particularly significant in the Public Sector, Financial and Business 
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Services and Manufacturing. Even in sectors with a relatively insignificant presence in the 
base, such as Retail and Construction, losses are in the range of 700 to 900 FTE jobs. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
It is useful to compare and contrast the impacts of each of the contractions outlined in this 
paper and these are set out next. 
 
Contraction Scenarios Compared 
Figure 4 sets out the change in direct employment from the various scenarios. The cessation 
of shipbuilding produces a modest decline from the baseline position. The significant decline 
in BAE shipbuilding and sub-contract shipbuilding staff is partially offset by the increase in 
crew brought about by the arrival of the new aircraft carriers. If ship support activity is also 
radically reduced, so that the Base becomes a Fleet operating center, there are decreases in 
all major elements of employment except ships’ crew, which remains above the baseline 
position. In the case of base closure, the analysis suggests that there is merely a rump of 
direct employment left at the facility with no ships’ crew and just a skeleton staff maintaining 
the fabric of the base until it is sold.  
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Figure 5 shows the total number of FTE jobs under each of the contraction scenarios. These 
are benchmarked against the baseline position. The dark portion of each column represents 
the direct FTE jobs within the Base itself and the light portion the downstream jobs 
elsewhere in the local economy. Both show a decline but in the scenario of the base closing 
altogether the number of downstream FTE jobs far exceeds the residual Base employment. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
The time path of any reduction is assumed to be around five years37. Figure 6 shows an 
indicative path of employment change. There is the sudden reduction in shipbuilding 
employment followed by a more gradual reduction as the jobs associated with downstream 
spending are shed over the following years. If the Base were to become a Fleet operating 
station, the sudden drop in shipbuilding activity is followed by a more gradual rundown in 
other activity as units and work are transferred elsewhere. In the case of complete closure 
the rundown is sharp in the first year followed by a more gradual decline throughout the rest 
of the period as activity is relocated and downstream jobs decline as a result of lost 
expenditure associated with the base.  
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Insert Figure 6 here 
 
The scenarios above do not take into account the effect that a partial or complete closure of 
the Base might have on other elements of the local defence industrial base or co-located 
command, support and training establishments. However, the impact is likely to be significant 
as witnessed by the previous closures of naval facilities at Chatham (Kent) and Portland 
(Dorset).  
 
Clearly, the closure of the Portsmouth Naval Base would have other implications for the local 
area which can only be a matter of conjecture. It can be assumed, however, that the impact 
would be significant. BAE alone has an additional 1,150+ jobs within the local area and the 
RN a further 5,150 staff on adjacent shore bases or with other organisations lodged within 
the Naval Base itself. Under a closure scenario all of these positions might be threatened in 
the short-run, particularly if the Base were put up for disposal.  
 
6. ADJUSTING TO CHANGE 
Hitherto, the paper has restricted the consideration of downsizing to the gross impact of 
contraction, viz. the impact of changes without the introduction of possible offsetting 
positive adjustments. Consequently, the numerical outcomes can be viewed as constituting 
the upper limit of negative employment and income effects. In practice, over time, 
affirmative factors will act to mitigate some or all of the losses arising from the contraction 
in defence activity, though ‘turning swords into ploughshares’ is more often than not a far 
from seamless process.  
Southern England, one of the most defence dependent regions in Europe, has had extensive 
experience of adjusting to changes in the level of military activity during the post-Cold War 
era. It is therefore instructive to note the subsequent and to a degree contrasting history of 
two former naval facilities: HMS Vernon (a shore establishment with a waterfront location in 
Portsmouth) and HMS Daedalus (a Royal Naval air station situated at Lee-On-Solent some 
four miles from the city). The former commenced its slow demise in 1987 and did not re-
open as Gunwharf Quays; an ‘up-market’ mixed retail, entertainment and residential cluster, 
until 2001. By 2012 it provided more employment opportunities and a greater flow of 
income than under its former guise as a naval facility. HMS Daedalus also failed to attract 
rapid alternative use. Following closure in 1996, the site lay fallow until subsequently 
designated an enterprise zone by the Government in 2011, in an attempt to ‘kick start’ 
alternative investment and use.  
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Slightly further afield, the area associated with the former Portland Naval Base in Dorset, 
which was an early casualty of the ending of the Cold War, has experienced some difficulty 
in adapting to change. The base itself finally closed in 1995 and the adjacent RN air station in 
1999. However, the rundown and redeployment of personnel from the three main MoD 
service and civilian organisations formally based at Portland (Flag Officer Sea Training, the 
Sea Systems Controllerate and the Defence Research Agency) had started earlier. 
Unemployment levels in Weymouth and Portland, that traditionally were below the national 
average, in the summer quarter, began to edge up to the UK average as closure loomed and 
only started to fall back again once the site was handed over to Portland Port Ltd to be 
brought back into commercial maritime related use in 1996. Employment gained a further 
fillip as the national sailing Academy came on-line and the build up to the 2012 Olympic 
Games commenced.  Unemployment eventually returned to a level consistently below the 
UK average, but above the county average, where it has remained. Even so, youth 
unemployment remained high and unemployment is higher than the district average in the 
ward adjacent to the former naval base.  
However, the nature of the Portland labour market has changed markedly. Vacancy data 
suggested that following closure, the type of jobs on offer were more likely to be part-
time38. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data indicates that those made redundant, were adjusting 
to the changed situation by taking on alternative employment or opting for self-
employment. Hence, economic activity rates remained close to the national average, 
dipping only slightly post closure before recovering, and throughout the period long-term 
unemployment remained relatively static. There were also some indications of a “mini brain 
drain” as people moved away. LFS data suggests that qualification levels39 fell and an 
economic and labour market profile from Dorset County Council in 2013 reported an 
outflow of younger people and an influx of those in the pre-retirement age bracket40. To add 
to the evidence of a changing labour market, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
showed that pay was also significantly below the UK average after the closure, although 
there are no comparable figures for the pre-closure period41. Substantial out-commuting 
was also a feature of the local economy, suggesting that a significant number of local 
residents have to travel outside the local area to obtain employment commensurate with 
their personal skill set. Another indication of the fragility of the local economy is given by 
business survival rates, In Dorset generally these are better than the national average but in 
Weymouth and Portland they are at, or below, the national average after three years of 
operation42.  
Turning to the most recent defence-related contraction to be visited upon Portsmouth, the 
demise of warship construction, the potential outcome is not particularly positive. The 
experience from elsewhere in the UK suggests that the experience of people in the former 
workforce, post-redundancy, tends to vary considerably. This was certainly the case 
following the closure of the Swan Hunter shipyard on Tyneside in 1993 (see Tomaney et al. 
1998). Designers and others with higher skill sets found a demand for their skills elsewhere 
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in Britain and overseas. For others who remained in the locality, alternative work often 
resulted in less attractive terms and conditions, often with a move into less permanent types 
of employment. The overall aftermath was that: ‘the local economy suffered from the 
negative multipliers generated by irregular and insecure work and reduced incomes’ 
(Tomoney et. al. 1998, p.410). While Portsmouth has a relatively diversified economy, there 
is a danger that without supporting measures it could experience a similar outcome. Since 
the ending of naval construction at Portsmouth, recruitment advertisements for staff with 
key ship construction skills have appeared in the local press from companies as far afield as 
British Columbia, but the prospects for other workers are less certain.  
Overall, past experience in southern England suggests that considerable time elapses before 
closed naval facilities are brought back into major economic use. Even so, as Gunwharf 
Quays illustrates, in the longer term replacement activity could well exceed that lost as a 
result of reduced naval employment. This article has not attempted to measure such 
displacement activity because as Droff and Paloyo (2014) attest ‘none of the models 
currently in use are sufficiently dynamic to capture ‘any equilibrating processes that the 
economy might undergo’. 
This shortcoming of the tools of analysis notwithstanding, since the end of the Cold War 
areas of the UK experiencing significant problems as a result of defence contraction have 
been able to draw on a range of assistance at both European Union (EU) and national level. 
The EU’s Konver programme of the 1990s, for example, constituted a funding stream to 
facilitate adjustment to defence cuts (see Hooper and Cox 1996). More recently in specific 
response to the end of warship construction in the city, the UK government created the 
position of Minister for Portsmouth to help co-ordinate measures designed to foster 
economic growth. Promising initiatives to date have included a £5m fund to assist 
companies develop technology for unmanned boats and submarines. That stated, how 
readily and how effectively the economy of Portsmouth and its surrounding area will adjust 
to the loss of its shipbuilding capability is not discernable at this point in time. Moreover, as 
this paper has sought to demonstrate, the adjustment required would be far greater if the 
Naval Base were to be reduced to an operating station or closed.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Whilst many studies of the local or regional impact of defence activity utilise input-output 
models in order to quantify the economic consequences of a distinct change in military 
activity, this paper has used the methodology to identify a range of contraction outcomes. In 
doing so, the analysis has served to highlight the importance of the Portsmouth Naval Base 
to the local economy. The activities at the Base, in conjunction with downstream multiplier 
effects through the defence supply chain, household and other expenditures, were estimated 
to have produced about £1.7bn of output in 2011. This supported approaching 20,000 jobs in 
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the local economy. Overall, Base activities represented almost 3.5 per cent of local area 
output and more than 4 per cent all FTE jobs. For specific sectors it was even more 
important; supporting almost 70 per cent of jobs in shipbuilding, 27 per cent in Facilities 
Management and 14 per cent of those in Public Administration and Defence.  
 
The Base itself provided employment for an estimated 11,900 people, 60 per cent of whom 
were civilian employees working for defence dependent companies and the MoD. Of these 
almost 77 per cent live within the local area.  There were also a significant number of jobs 
associated with other defence companies and local RN and MoD establishments.  
 
On the basis of the assumptions made to support the various contraction outcome scenarios 
presented, it is estimated that employment losses of around 4,000 to 18,000 FTE jobs could 
occur. What is also clear is that the brunt of any change would fall disproportionately upon 
the urban areas of South Hampshire, as this was where most of the workforce lived. 
However, because of the multiplier effect the decline would be felt across all sectors and 
locations in the local economy. Thus any change that impacts directly on the Base is likely to 
ripple out to other sectors that are not commercially connected to the facility. In short, the 
analysis contained in this paper demonstrates the importance of using reliable primary data, 
or if this is unavailable, transparent and traceable assumptions to estimate the primary 
impact. Further, the paper demonstrates the flexibility achievable as a result of using the 
input-output methodology to account for downstream effects and also to examine a range of 
outcomes in a consistent and coherent manner. Moreover, the suppleness of the approach 
extends to the investigation of other types of military facilities and geographical contexts both 
in the UK and elsewhere. Finally, it is worthy of note that the experience in Southern England 
indicates that it would be erroneous to presume that redundant military facilities will rapidly 
re-emerge as civilian assets generating compensatory employment and income flows. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The Solent Local Enterprise Sub-Regional Partnership Area 
 
Figure 2:  The stages of estimating local output 
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Figure 3 – Direct, Indirect and induced effects of the Naval Base 
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Figure 4: Number of direct FTE jobs under different contraction scenarios 
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Figure 5: Total FTE employment under different contraction scenarios 
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Figure 6: Indicative time paths of FTE job losses under different contraction scenarios 
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Tables Page 
Table 1: Direct employment of staff (FTEs) 
Category of staff Total 
Resident within the 
sub-regional area1 
Sub-regional 
residents as a 
Percentage of total 
Portsmouth Naval base permanent armed service staff 400 250 63% 
Portsmouth Naval base MoD civilian staff 225 200 89% 
Shipbuilding permanent & fixed term staff 1,325 1,250 94% 
Maritime Services permanent & fixed term 1,800 1,750 97% 
All permanent staff 3,750 3,450 92% 
Ships’ crew 4,500 2,200 49% 
BAE Sub-contract staff 975 925 95% 
Other permanent contract staff 2,475 2,350 95% 
Heritage staff 200 200 100% 
Crew, contractor and heritage staff 8,150 5,675 70% 
Grand totals 11,900 9,125 77% 
Sources: PNB Commodores Office, BAE (2012), Portsmouth Naval Base Property Trust, and Asteris et al (2007). 
Note: 1  Refers to the area shown in Figure 1 
All figures have been rounded to the nearest 25 
 
Table 2: Naval Base expenditure – the direct effect   
 Cohort 
Number of 
staff1 
Gross salaries 
£m1 
Net 
salaries2 
£m 
Local 
expenditure3 
£m 
Base service personnel residing locally 250 £2.467 £2.023 £1.207 
Crew residing locally 2200 £24.732 £20.280 £12.095 
Armed Service personnel residing locally 2450  £27.199 £22,303 £13.302 
BAE permanent workforce residing locally 3000 £93.013 £76.271 £45.490 
MoD & Heritage permanent civilian staff residing locally 400 £9.509 £7.798 £4.651 
All contractors residing locally  3275 £91.565 £75.084 £44.782 
Civilian Staff residing locally 6675  £194.088  £159.153 £94.923 
Total Household income/expenditure (a) £221.287 £181.455 £108.224 
Ship’s Crew residing elsewhere in UK 
 
  £11.185 
Visiting Ships' Crew 
 
  £2.349 
Heritage Visitors 
 
  £14.179 
Visitor spending (b) 
 
  £27.712 
Local purchase of supplies and services (c) 
 
  £197.498 
Civilian and service commuters and base visitors residing out of area (d) 
 
  £0.640 
Total (a+b+c+d) 
 
  £334.075 
Notes:  1 Staff figures are rounded to nearest 25, income and expenditure figures rounded to nearest £1,000 
                    2 Net salaries are the residual after deductions for income tax, employers and employees national insurance  
                    3 Available for local consumption after the effect of imports, and expenditure taxes are taken into account 
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Table 3: Naval Base employment direct output, and inputs to local economy 
Sector 
Base FTE 
Employment 
Base output 
(£m) 
Expenditure by 
companies1 
(£m) 
Expenditure by 
individuals2 
(£m) 
Total first 
round 
expenditure 
inputs £m  
Primary Products - 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 
Manufacturing3 2,675 259.3 63.5 10.4 73.9 
Construction 425 49.4 24.9 1.4 26.3 
Retail & Wholesale 75 5.2 0.5 36.6 37.1 
Hotel and Catering 75 5.4 0.4 26.7 27.1 
Transport, Telecom and Vehicle Repairs 625 68.5 3.5 18.5 22.0 
Financial and Business Services 2,525 109.4 61.9 25.2 87.1 
Public Sector4 5,150 434.3 36.1 6.3 42.4 
Cultural and Other Services 325 27.3 6.7 11.0 17.7 
Total 11,900 958.7 197.5 136.6 334.1 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
Notes:    
                     1Input driving indirect effect (c from Table 2)  
                     2Input driving induced effect (a+b+d from Table 2) 
                     3Includes Utilities 
4Includes armed service personnel. 
              All employment figures are rounded to the nearest 25, output and expenditure to the nearest £100,000 
 
Table 4: Downstream expenditure and employment impact of the Naval Base 
 
1st round (a) Induced multiplier (b) Indirect multiplier (c) 
Total downstream impact 
(a+b+c) 
Sector injection 
£million 
FTE 
jobs 
output 
£million 
FTE 
jobs 
output 
£million 
FTE 
jobs 
output 
£million 
FTE 
jobs 
Primary Products £0.5 <25 £1.1 <25 £1.6 <25 £3.2 25 
Manufacturing £73.9 600 £26.2 150 £54.2 325 £154.3 1,075 
Construction £26.3 225 £11.3 100 £27.6 225 £65.2 550 
Retail & Wholesale £37.1 650 £4.9 50 £10.8 100 £52.7 800 
Hotel and Catering £27.1 425 £1.5 25 £1.8 25 £30.4 475 
Transport, Telecom and Vehicle 
Repairs 
£22.0 200 £29.0 275 £34.8 350 £85.8 825 
Financial and Business Services £87.1 950 £58.7 625 £91.4 1,050 £237.2 2,625 
Public Sector £42.4 775 £7.3 125 £13.7 200 £63.5 1,100 
Cultural and Other Services £17.7 225 £5.5 75 £7.5 100 £30.7 400 
Total £334.1 4050 £145.5 1,425 £243.5 2,400 £723.1 7,875 
Note:   All output figures are rounded to the nearest £100,000 and all employment figures to the nearest 25 
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Table 5: Baseline impact of the Naval Base 
Sector Base Direct 
output 
£million 
Base Direct 
FTE 
Employment 
Downstream 
output 
£million 
Downstream 
FTE 
employment 
Base total 
output 
£million 
Base total 
FTE 
employment 
Primary products 0.0 - £3.2 25 3.2  50  
Manufacturing 259.3 2,675 £154.3 1,075 413.6  3,750  
Construction 49.4 425 £65.2 550 114.6  975  
Retail & wholesale 5.2 75 £52.7 800 57.8  875  
Hotel and catering 5.4 75 £30.4 475 35.8  575  
Transport telecom and vehicle repairs 68.5 625 £85.8 825 154.3  1,450  
Financial and business services 109.4 2,525 £237.2 2,625 346.6  5,150  
Public sector 434.3 5,150 £63.5 1,100 497.8  6,250  
Cultural and other services 27.3 325 £30.7 400 58.1  725  
Total 958.7 11,900 £723.1 7,875 1,681.8  19,775  
Output and employment multipliers 
  
  1.75 1.66 
Note:   All output figures are rounded to the nearest £100,000 and all employment figures are rounded to the nearest 25 
 
Table 6: Contraction scenario outcomes compared 
Sector 
Baseline Contraction Scenario 1 Contraction Scenario 2 Contraction Scenario 3 
Total 
output 
£million 
Total FTE 
employment 
Total 
output 
£million 
Total FTE 
employment 
Total 
output 
£million 
Total FTE 
employment 
Total 
output 
£million 
Total FTE 
employment 
Primary products 3.2 50 2.3 25 1.0 25 0.6 -  
Manufacturing 413.6 3,750 166.9 1,375 61.6 500 39.2 350 
Construction 114.6 975 88.8 750 21.6 175 7.2 50 
Retail & wholesale 57.8 875 46.2 725 24.3 400 12.3 200 
Hotel and catering 35.8 575 31.8 500 20.3 325 9.9 150 
Transport telecom and 
vehicle repairs 
154.3 1,450 130.6 1,225 45.8 425 16.5 150 
Financial and business 
services 
346.6 5,150 263.7 4,175 80.9 1,075 39.3 525 
Public sector 497.8 6,250 529.9 6,500 474.7 5,675 12.3 175 
Cultural and other services 58.1 725 49.8 625 30.0 400 17.4 250 
Total 1,681.8 19,775 1,310.0 15,900 760.3 9,000 154.8 1,850 
Note:    All employment figures are rounded to the nearest 25, output figures to the nearest £100,000 
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Endnotes 
                                                                
* Corresponding  author: E-mail: shabbar.jaffry@port.ac.uk 
 
1 It is interesting to note that while the majority of studies relating to military facility contraction or closure in the USA and the UK 
reveal that they have a sizeable adverse economic impact on the local community, research by Poloyo et al (2010) shows that 
this has not been the experience with bases operated by the German armed forces in Germany. The authors attribute the 
relative lack of impact on the surrounding economy to four key characteristics (which tend not to be replicated in the USA or 
Britain). To begin with, when compared with their American counterparts in Germany, the bases closed were much smaller. 
Secondly, they were relatively self-sufficient and autonomous. Thirdly, closed facilities were swiftly transferred to civilian use on 
the basis of substantial new investment. Finally, base occupants, whether military or civilian, tended to be reassigned to other 
bases, rather than declared redundant. The employment and tax revenue implications of closure were thereby minimised. In 
addition, it should be noted that the federal structure of German administration ensures that regional and local authorities enjoy 
wider powers of intervention than their counterparts in the UK. 
2 The Droff and Paloyo paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Input-Output Models (IOMs), Economic Bases Models 
(EBMs), Regional Keynesian Multiplier Models (RMMs), Regional Econometric Models (REMs) and Case studies/ Monographic 
Approaches.   
3 This includes the six new Type-45 destroyers and the 13 Type-26 Global Combat Ships that will gradually replace Type-23 
frigates. 
4 Eight mine countermeasure vessels Hunt Class, (based at Portsmouth); seven Sandown Class, (based on the Clyde); four 
survey vessels, (based in Plymouth); four River Class Fishery patrol craft and an Ice Patrol vessel (based in Portsmouth) and 
smaller inshore patrol boats. 
5 RFA ships spend relatively long periods at sea. They are not usually base-ported at the main naval bases; for instance, the 
Bay class vessels are based at Marchwood military port, Southampton.  
6 Authors own estimations. 
7 GVA is the sum of wages and salaries and operating surpluses (profits). The proportionate figure is derived from the 
intermediate demand column of the national input output analytical tables (2005).  
8 Input-output modelling takes advantage of the ease with which large matrices can be inverted by computers to provide a 
greater level of detail regarding the disaggregation of economic impacts by industrial sector. 
9 A study by Tomaney, Pike and Cornford (1999) into the effect of the closure of Swan Hunter on Tyneside suggests that 
structural unemployment increased dramatically following the closure. Those aged under 40 and more skilled workers were 
often able to relocate or re-train whilst older workers either, remained unemployed or dropped out of the labour market (either 
through long-term sickness or retirement). Plant Closure and the local economy: The case of Swan Hunter on Tyneside, 
Tomaney J, Pike A and Cornford J, Regional Studies, 33(5), July 1999, p.401. 
10 For the GB total the Annual Population Survey (APS) self-employment by industry group structure is used as the basis for the 
pro rata redistribution to the 123 I-O sectors. For local area estimates the appropriate regional self-employment structure used 
to distribute local area totals which are then allocated pro-rata to the structure of employees in employment in each local area. 
11 The local Location Quotient (LQ) expresses the relationship between the proportion of employment within a particular 
industrial sector in the LEP Area and the proportion in the same sector at a national level. For example, an LQ of 0.5 for a 
particular sector would indicate that the LEP Area has half the proportion of employment in that sector compared with the 
national average. Any sector in the LEP Area which experiences a higher proportion of employment than the national average is 
given an LQ of 1. 
12 Direct output from the base might be classified as maritime security which is exported nationally and internationally rather 
than consumed locally. The total value of this in 2011 was estimated at £0.43bn.    
13 This includes other units that were located in the Naval Base and HMS Nelson but not responsible for the upkeep of the base 
itself. There were in the region of a further 1,500 service personnel and 1,080 MoD civilian personnel in this capacity. 
14 Included companies such as, Serco Denholm Ltd and Sodexo Defence Services Ltd. 
15 This Includes Mary Rose Trust, National Museum of the RN, HMS Victory, Action Stations and the Warrior Preservation 
Trust. These attractions, in total, are estimated to attract around 400,000 visitors per annum. 
16 Some 88 per cent work in the shipbuilding division. 
17 Annonomised domicile information for individuals employed at the base was collated by the authors on a confidential basis 
some years ago. 
18 In order to calculate the economic impact of the Base, where possible, primary data from companies and individuals was 
utilised; where this proved impossible, secondary data was obtained from sources identified in this paper. 
19 See column 2, Table 1. 
20 For sub-contractors, it was assumed the same cost of employment figures associated with BAE permanent staff applied. A 
further 20 per cent was deducted to account for contract supplier companies profit element. This figure is in line with the gross 
operating surplus figure for the Other Business Services sector in the detailed national input output tables.  
21 Average salaries for staff, based on primary wage and domicile data for individual staff in 2004, were up-rated for inflation to 
estimate average salaries at 2011 prices.   
22Research indicates that US and UK ships spend an average of 40 per cent of their time at “sea”.  
23 As with visiting ships, this figure was deflated by 20 per cent to account for those required to remain onboard. 
24 No attempt was made to differentiate between UK and overseas visitors owing to the lack of reliable data. Thus, the figure 
may be regarded as one that underestimates the impact of visitors.   
25 Information on the spending on supplies and services by the Naval Base Commodore’s operations was unavailable. It is 
highly likely that there is an element of local expenditure, but in the absence of reliable data (or a suitable methodology for 
estimating it) this was omitted from the calculations.    
26 Detailed figures for the amounts spent in each SIC category outside the LEP area were unavailable. 
27 The additional spending created through the multiplier decreases with each additional round, until it is effectively zero.  
28 It can be assumed that the presence of military establishments and defence-related organisations is attributable to the fact 
that Portsmouth has for centuries been regarded as the “home” of the RN. 
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29 This included ship upgrade, repair, engineering, logistics and support services. 
30 The increase is due to the QE Class aircraft carriers joining the fleet. 
31 A small number of staff remained in BAE’s shipbuilding facility to maintain the building and equipment should BAE need to 
reopen the facility at some future date. .   
32 Babcock are the ship support consortium operating the Devonport Naval Base in Plymouth in the UK. 
33 Unlike shipbuilding there is a small residual of ship support activity although this may not be undertaken by BAE. 
34 It is assumed that 20 per cent of naval base civilian staff retire and remain within the area thus continuing to contribute to 
household spending.   
35 This reflects the fact that almost all shipbuilding and ship support activity has ceased.  
36 A small residual mainly from the heritage area remains.  
37 In practice cannot be assumed to be smooth. 
38 By the summer quarter of 1998 the number of vacancies in the Dorchester and Weymouth Travel To Work Area (TTWA) that 
were part time had increased by about two thirds since the summer quarter of 1995, whilst nationally (GB), over the same 
period the increase was in the order of 13 per cent. 
39 The proportion of the workforce qualified to at least NVQ3 or above fell from significantly above the national average in 1997-
98 to well below the national average by 2000-01. 
40 Aged 45-64. 
41 Resident-based ASHE date reveals that median gross weekly pay for full-time employees is considerably higher than the 
equivalent workplace measure. 
42 See Dorset County Council, (November 2013), Weymouth and Portland Economy and Labour Market Profile, p. 19. 
